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I. Introduction

The purchasing power parity theory (PPP) is an economic theory that

has received a great deal of attention in the literature. The theory
basically identifies the national price levels in two countries as the
long-run determinants of the corresponding exchange rate. Denoting
the number of country i's currency per U.S. dollar (the reserve currency) by Ri,.s., the price level in country i by Pi, and the price level
in the United States by Pu.s., the PPP theory postulates that Ri,u.s. =
Pi/Pu.s.. Many studies have tried to verify whether exchange rates follow the path outlined by the PPP equation. The empirical results, at
best, are inconclusive. For example, J. A. Frenkel tested the PPP by
drawing data from the 1970s and showed that the PPP failed.' On the
other hand, N. Davutyan and J. Pippenger criticized Frenkel's work
and reversed his conclusion.2 Both studies used ordinary least squares

and two-stage least squares methods. Even recent studies that have
used a relatively modern econometric technique (cointegration analysis), have mostly rejected the PPP.3
Several reasons have been given in the literature for the failure of
the PPP or deviation of the PPP-based exchange rates from equilibrium
exchange rates, including lack of free trade; existence of transaction

costs; existence of nontradables; simultaneity problems; different
weights used in constructing different national price indexes; money
and asset prices; and real factors or real variables. Among the real
variables, the productivity differential between two countries has re-

ceived most of the attention in the literature.

If we denote the market-determined equilibrium exchange rate by

Re and the PPP-based rate by Pi/Pu.s., following the literature we
? 1996 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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can measure the deviation of PPP from the equilibrium exchan

by (Pi/Pu.s.)/Reu.s., which is nothing but the real exchange rat
country i and the United States. In a path-breaking article in
Balassa was the first to claim that the deviation of PPP from the
rium rate or the real exchange rate is positively related to th
productivity in country i over that of the United States. As
stated, "If per capita incomes are taken as representative of
productivity, the ratio of purchasing-power parity to the exch
will thus be an increasing function of income levels."4 Anoth
pretation of Balassa's conjecture is that the more productive
will have an overvalued currency in real terms. This notion
known as the "productivity bias hypothesis in PPP." Following
Balassa justified his conjecture.

Assuming the United States as his base country, Balas

structed (PI/Pu.s.)/Ru.s. for 12 industrial countries (inclu

United States itself) for 1960 and regressed it on real per capit
of each country in the same year. With 12 cross-sectional obs
he obtained a highly significant positive coefficient with an R
He then concluded that "the empirical results provide eviden
the validity of my proposition regarding the relationship be

purchasing power parities, exchange rates, and per capita
levels.'"5
Subsequent cross-sectional studies, however, provided mixed
support for Balassa's hypothesis. M. G. de Vries investigated the depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rates of 109 members of
the International Monetary Fund from 1948 until 1967.6 She found
that far more less developed countries devalued their currencies or
experienced depreciation in their currencies than did developed countries and she attributed this finding to productivity advances in more
developed countries, especially in the production of exportables.7
C. Clague and V. Tanzi examined the relevance of other variables
in addition to per capita income. Using data from 1960 for the same
12 Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD)
countries and 19 Latin American countries, they found that in the case
of the 12 OECD countries, when only per capita income was used as
a determinant of the real exchange rate, the Balassa effect received
strong support. However, the results for 19 Latin American countries
were weaker.8 J. Grunwald and J. Salazar-Carillo examined the experience of 11 Latin American countries. They used Venezuela rather than
the United States as their base country. They concluded, "It appears
that without further manipulation Latin American data are not consistent with the Balassa hypothesis and that therefore there are, in this
respect, significant differences between the developing and developed

countries which Balassa examined."9
In addition to per capita income, I. B. Kravis and R. E. Lipsey
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considered the relevance of openness and share of nontradable goods
in gross domestic product (GDP) of 34 countries in 1975.l0 But it wa
mostly per capita income that had a significantly positive effect on th

real exchange rate. Kravis and Lipsey also obtained similar result

when the number of countries was reduced to 10." Using data from
the same 34 countries in 1975, Clague examined the effects of trade

balance, mineral share in GDP, tourism, education, and money
growth.12 While the results were sensitive to model specification, it was

the trade balance, mineral share, and tourism that carried significant
coefficients in most of the models. Similar models were also tried b
Clague, who, this time, employed data from at most 19 Latin America

countries in 1970.13 While the significance of some of the 'variables
was sensitive to model specification, the real per capita income was
significant in all models, supporting the productivity bias hypothesis
L. H. Officer reexamined the productivity bias hypothesis after
modifying Balassa's model.14 The resulting model was estimated for
each year from 1950 to 1973 using cross-sectional data from 15 indus
trial countries, with Germany serving as the standard country.15 In
none of the years did Balassa's hypothesis receive empirical support
Other modifications in calculating productivity measures did not alte
the results. Officer then concluded that "the evidence provided by
this study indicates that the productivity bias hypothesis lacks a firm
empirical foundation, suggesting that the general acceptance of the
hypothesis is unwarranted. With careful attention paid to the experi
mental design of the test, the productivity bias was found to have n
operational impact on the PPP over exchange rate relationship, except
in extremely rare cases."916
One issue involved in testing the productivity bias hypothesis is
whether the equilibrium exchange rates or the PPP-based rates should
be used in converting per capita incomes from domestic currencies to
the base country currency. In its National Accounts Statistics, th
United Nations introduced six conversion factors that they used to
convert per capita GDP of more than 100 developed countries (DCs)
and less developed countries (LDCs) for each year from 1970 to 1989.1
With this extensive data base, it is the purpose of this article to reexam-

ine Balassa's hypothesis using cross-sectional data from more than 10

countries for each year. In Section II we formulate the model an

introduce the results. Section III has the conclusion.
II. The Model and the Results

In order to test the operational impact of the productivity bias, we
adopted the formulation of the hypothesis by Officer as follows:"

= a + I3(PRODi/PRODu.s.) + Ei, (1)
, U.S.
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where Pi = price level in country i measured by GDP deflator
= 100) and collected from different issues of International Fi

Statistics of IMF; Pu.s. = price level in the United States m

by GDP deflator (1985 = 100) and collected from different iss
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetar

(IMF);
R u.s.i's
= equilibrium
exchange
defined
as number
of country
currency per
unit of rate
the U.S.
dollar.
For each o
and each year, the rates are collected from different issues of
tional Financial Statistics of the IMF; PRODi = productivity o
try i measured by per capita GDP in constant U.S. dollars. Th
for all countries come from the National Account Statistics of the

United Nations;`9 PRODu.s. = productivity of the United States mea
sured by per capita GDP in constant U.S. dollars. The data come fro
the same source as PRODi; and E is an error term. If a more productiv
country is to experience an appreciation of its real currency, an est
mate of p should be positive and significant.
As indicated above, the United Nations recently used six differen
conversion factors to convert per capita GDP of more than 100 cou
tries into U.S. dollars. A brief explanation of each factor follows.
The first conversion rate (labeled MER in each country page) is
based on market exchange rates (MERs). These are the rates that are
regularly published by the IMF, and they are basically annual averag
communicated to the IMF by the monetary authority of each membe
country. However, it has been argued that because exchange rates d
not adequately reflect differences in international prices (due to capit
flow and speculation), they might be even less effective conversion
rates for nontraded goods and services. That is why it may be appro
priate to employ alternative measures.
The second conversion rate is the PPP-based exchange rate (labeled PPP in each country page). For each country it is derived from
relative prices of a common basket of goods and services expressed
in terms of each country's currency.
The third conversion rate is based on price adjustments of ex
change rates, or the so-called PAREs rates. These rates are derive
by extrapolating the exchange rates to past and future years by usin
price indexes from each country. This third measure is labeled Abs
lute 1970-89 PARE in each country page. Its calculations use the ave
age exchange rates for the entire period 1970-89 as a proxy for the
relative prices between the United States and other countries.
The fourth conversion rate is the same as the third rate with the

difference that it relies on relative PAREs. It is labeled Relative

1970-89 PARE in each country page.

The fifth conversion rate is similar to the third measure with the

difference that the extrapolation period is 1980-89 and not 1970-89.
This measure is labeled Absolute 1980-89 PARE.
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Finally, the sixth rate is the World Bank Atlas Conversion Rate,

denoted by WA. It is based on a moving average of three types of

conversion rates. For a given year, it is calculated as a simple average

of the exchange rate of the present year and a PARE rate for the

present year using the exchange rate of 2 years ago as a base.
Using six different measures of per capita income (based on six
different conversion rates), we estimated equation (1) using crosssectional data from 21 DCs and approximately 80 LDCs for a given
year, from 1974 to 1989.20 Note that we followed Officer's procedure,
who estimated similar cross-sectional regressions for each year from
1950 to 1973, a relatively fixed exchange rate era. We started with 1974
in order to confine ourselves to a relatively floating exchange rate era
and hoped that our finding would be somewhat different. Since we
were to determine whether the slope coefficient in equation (1) is significant, we confined ourselves to reporting the t-ratio for the slope
and the adjusted R2 of the regression only. Table 1 reports the cross-

sectional results for each year when only 21 DCs were included in
each regression. Table 2 reports similar results for approximately 80
LDCs. Finally, table 3 reports the cross-sectional results when both
DCs and LDCs were included in the regression.
As shown in all three tables, not only were all t-ratios insignificant,

but the adjusted R2 was negative in almost all cases, providing negative
implication for the productivity bias hypothesis. This was the conclusion regardless of which conversion rate was used to convert the
per capita income figures from domestic currency to the U.S. dollar.
Our results are similar to those of Officer's (tables 2-7), indicating
the fact that extending Officer's study beyond 1973 to 1989 and extending his sample size from 15 to more than 100 did not alter his
findings.21

III. Summary and Conclusion
In 1964 Balassa argued that productivity differentials between two
countries contribute to the deviation of PPP from the equilibrium exchange rate, now known as the productivity bias hypothesis. However,
most other cross-sectional studies have failed to support this hypothesis. While most studies were restricted to cross-sectional data only for
one or two periods, Officer tested the hypothesis by relying on "a
moving cross-sectional regression, fitted independently over a number
of years (and not pooling data of different years).'"22
In this article, we tried to verify empirically the productivity bias

hypothesis, following Officer's moving cross-sectional regression
approach beyond his last year (1973). We tested the hypothesis
using cross-sectional data from more than 100 countries (DCs and
LDCs) and six different measures of per capita income for each year
beginning with 1974 and ending at 1989. The results are in line with
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TABLE 1

ESTIMATES OF THE t-RATIO FOR THE SLOPE COEFFICIENT AND ADJUST

(Based on Different Conversion

CONVERSION RATE 1 CONVERSION RATE 2 CONVERSION RATE 3 CONVERSION R

YEAR t-Ratio Adj. R2 t-Ratio Adj. R2 t-Ratio Adj. R2 t-Ratio Ad

0
0

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

.25 -.05 .36 -.04 .42 -.04 .42 -.
.04 -.05 .39 -.04 -.01 -.05 -.01 .06 -.05 .47 -.04 .05 -.05 .05 -.
-.38 -.04 .31 -.05 -.07 -.05 -.07 -.58 -.03 .18 -.05 -.20 -.05 -.19 -.
-.59 -.03 -.01 -.05 -.36 -.05 -.36 -.
-.39 -.04 -.24 -.05 -.52 -.04 -.51 -.
.02 -.05 -.06 -.05 -.47 -.04 -.47 -.
.16 -.05 .39 -.04 -.54 -.04 -.54 -.0

1983 .33 -.01 -.09 -.05 -.44 -.04 -.44 1984 .39 -.04 .03 -.05 -.36 -.04 -.36 -.
1985 .10 -.05 -.03 -.05 -.42 -.04 -.42 1986 -.72 -.02 -.27 -.05 -.60 -.03 -.61 -.
1987 -.88 -.01 -.28 -.05 -.62 -.03 -.62 -.

1988
1989

-.82
-.52

-.02
-.04

-.27
-.21

-.05
-.05

-.61
-.56

-.03
-.04
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-.61
-.56

-.
-.

TABLE 2

ESTIMATES OF THE t-RATIO FOR THE SLOPE COEFFICIENT AND ADJUS

(Based on Different Conversio

CONVERSION RATE 1 CONVERSION RATE 2 CONVERSION RATE 3 CONVERSION R

YEAR t-Ratio Adj. R2 t-Ratio Adj. R2 t-Ratio Adj. R2 t-Ratio Ad

0>

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

-.22 -.01 -.09 -.01 -.09 -.01 -.02 -.29 -.01 -.07 -.01 -.10 -.01 -.10 .27 -.01 -.04 -.01 -.10 -.01 -.10 -.28 -.01 .05 -.01 -.09 -.01 -.09 - .35 -.01 -.05 -.01 -.13 -.01 -.13 -.40 -.01 -.29 -.01 -.24 -.01 -.24 -.
- .38 -.01 -.16 -.01 -.22 -.01 -.22 - .38 -.01 -.19 -.01 -.23 -.01 -.23 - .39 -.01 -.21 -.01 -.25 -.01 -.25 - .38 -.01 -.22 -.01 -.25 -.01 -.25 -.31 -.04 -.21 -.01 -.27 -.04 -.27 -.
-.32 -.01 -.18 -.01 -.29 -.01 -.29 -.
-.20 -..01 -.23 -.01 -.35 -.01 -.35 1.93 .04 -.30 -.01 -.38 -.01 -.38 -.
-.62 -.01 -.43 -.01 -.45 -.01 -.45 -.
-.05 -.01 -.25 -.01 -.30 -.01 -.29 -.
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TABLE 3

ESTIMATES OF THE t-RATIO FOR THE SLOPE COEFFICIENT AND ADJUSTED

(Based on Different Conversion

CONVERSION RATE 1 CONVERSION RATE 2 CONVERSION RATE 3 CONVERSION R

YEAR t-Ratio Adj. R2 t-Ratio Adj. R2 t-Ratio Adj. R2 t-Ratio Ad

0

hN

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

-.50 -.01 -.32 -.01 -.39 -.01 -.37 -.
-.56 -.01 -.35 -.01 -.39 -.01 -.39 -.
-.54 -.01 -.31 -.01 -.39 -.01 -.39 -.
-.55 -.01 -.25 -.01 -.39 -.01 -.39 -.
- .25 -.01 -.37 -.01 -.45 -.01 -.44 -.66 -.01 -.57 -.01 -.53 -.01 -.53 -.
-.64 -.01 -.44 -.01 -.51 -.01 -.51 -.
-.63 -.01 -.06 -.01 -.51 -.01 -.51 -.
-.63 -.01 -.48 -.01 -.54 -.01 -.53 -.
-.62 -.01 -.52 -.01 -.54 -.01 -.54 -.
-.52 -.01 -.52 -.01 -.55 -.04 -.55 -.
-.52 -.01 -.51 -.01 -.57 -.01 -.57 -.
-.52 -.01 -.54 -.01 -.59 -.01 -.59 -.
.43 -.01 -.60 -.01 -.62 -.01 -.62 -.
-.72 -.01 -.69 -.01 -.66 -.01 -.66 -.
-.52 -.01 -.62 -.01 -.62 -.01 -.62 -.
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Officer's, indicating a failure to confirm the productivity bias hypothesis.23
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